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Abstract	
This	article	explores	the	impact	of	violent	conflict	in	Nepal	on	the	functioning	of	
community	forestry	user‐groups	(CFUGs),	particularly	those	supported	by	the	DFID	
funded	Livelihoods	and	Forestry	Programme.	The	key	questions	are:	what	explains	
the	resilience	of	CFUGs	operating	at	the	time	of	conflict?	What	institutional	set	up	
and	strategies	allowed	them	to	continue	working	under	conflict?	What	lessons	can	
be	drawn	for	donor	supported	development	around	the	globe?	The	work	
contributes	to	other	research	on	the	everyday	experience	of	living	in	conflict	for	
residents	of	Nepal.	The	study	suggests	that	CFUG	resilience	was	due	to	the	
institutional	set	up	of	community	forestry	and	the	use	of	various	tactics	by	CFUGs.	
The	institutional	design	of	community	forestry	(structure)	was	very	important	for	
resilience,	but	it	was	the	ability	of	groups	to	support	and	use	that	structure	
effectively	that	was	the	determining	factor	in	their	resilience.	
Keywords:	violent	conflict,	community	forestry,	Nepal,	resource	governance,	
political	ecology	
	
Introduction	
The	Maoist	insurgency	in	Nepal	(1996‐2006)	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	ability	
of	development	projects	to	continue	operating	in	rural	areas	of	Nepal.	Community	
forestry	user‐groups	(CFUGs),	however,	proved	to	be	surprisingly	resilient	and	were	
able	to	function	in	many	places.		Previous	studies	have	sought	to	understand	
whether	CFUGs	were	resilient	and	the	impact	of	the	conflict	on	fear,	mobility	and	
development	in	a	community	forestry	context.	(Rechlin	et	al.,	2007).	Here	we	focus	
on	why	community	forestry	fared	so	differently	from	other	kinds	of	development	
programmes	and	in	doing	so,	we	shed	light	on	how	rural	residents	displayed	
remarkable	creativity,	resilience	and	tenacity	in	the	face	of	violence	and	
intimidation	by	both	conflicting	parties.	This	offers	insights	for	policy	makers,	aid	
agencies	and	practitioners	involved	in	development	work	in	conflict	affected	areas	
on	the	range	of	factors	that	help	support	people	in	these	areas,	including	tactics	
employed	by	residents	themselves.	The	article	discusses	the	experiences	of	working	
in	conflict	by	CFUGs	supported	through	UK’s	Department	for	International	
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Development	(DFID)	under	the	Livelihoods	and	Forestry	Programme	(LFP).1		The	
key	questions	engaged	are:	what	explains	the	resilience	of	CFUGs	operating	at	the	
time	of	conflict?	What	institutional	set	up	and	strategies	used	by	CFUGs	allowed	
them	to	continue	working	under	conditions	of	conflict?	What	lessons	can	be	drawn	
from	this	case	for	donor	supported	development	work	around	the	global	in	a	variety	
of	conflict‐ridden	contexts?	By	exploring	these	questions	we	contribute	to	other	
research	on	the	everyday	experience	of	living	in	conflict	by	rural	residents	of	Nepal	
(Shah,	2008,	Shneiderman	and	Turin,	2004a,	Lecomte‐Tilouine,	2009,	Pettigrew,	
2008,	Gersony,	2003)	and	help	to	probe	the	contributions	and	limitations	in	conflict	
situations	of	donor‐supported	modes	of	operation	in	natural	resource	management.		
Nepal	is	well	known	for	its	successful	community	forestry	programmes	and	indeed,	
it	is	seen	as	a	global	model	for	participatory	natural	resource	governance.	The	
Forest	Act	(1993)	gave	CFUGs	the	legal	authority	to	manage	their	local	forests	for	
sustainable	production.	Since	that	time	the	programme	has	proliferated	across	the	
country	and	currently	there	are	more	than	15,000	CFUGs	located	in	all	districts	
(Ojha	et	al.,	2008).	The	programme	is	largely	supported	by	a	number	of	bi‐lateral	
donors	including	DFID,	but	there	are	a	significant	number	of	user‐groups	located	in	
districts	not	supported	by	donors.	CFUGs	are	local,	self‐governed	institutions	bound	
by	written	constitutions	and	operational	plans	that	are	developed	in	consultation	
with	the	government	forestry	office.	Ideally,	they	make	decisions	by	consensus,	with	
members	appointing	executive	committees	to	manage	day‐to‐day	issues,	whilst	
annual	or	more	frequent	assemblies	of	members	oversee	the	committees’	work	and	
endorse	major	decisions.	In	practice,	decisions	are	often	made	by	majority	and	
issues	of	elite	capture	are	significant	(Arnold,	1998,	Neupane,	2003,	Nightingale,	
2006,	Nightingale,	2005,	Khadka,	2010,	Nightingale,	2003,	Ojha,	2008,	Ojha	et	al.,	
2008,	Thoms,	2008,	Timsina	and	Paudel,	2002).	DFID	has	been	one	of	the	principal	
donors	for	Nepal’s	community	forestry	programme,	and	the	second	phase	of	
support	—LFP	(2001–2011)—worked	in	15	districts	with	about	4,600	user	groups	
representing	roughly	half	a	million	households.	Most	of	the	District	level	
programme	was	delivered	through	service	providers	(local	NGOs)	who	helped	
improve	user	group	governance,	develop	the	livelihoods	and	incomes	of	group	
members,	and	ensure	access	to	resources	and	decision	making	by	socially	
disadvantaged	groups.	This	arrangement	has	meant	community	forestry	is	
somewhat	unique	among	donor‐supported	programmes	in	that	it	is	simultaneously	
considered	a	government	programme,		donor	supported	and	a	community	
institution	from	the	perspective	of	rural	residents	(Timsina	and	Paudel,	2002).	As	
will	be	illustrated	below,	this	liminal,	or	multiple,	status	contributed	to	the	
																																																								
1 LFP was keen to explore why CFUGs were so resilient during the conflict in Nepal, something for which 
all the forestry donors and independent researchers already had anecdotal evidence. This study was 
commissioned by them, engaging independent researchers who worked with their field level staff to collect 
the data. As a result, the research was contained to LFP areas only. We have also triangulated the data here 
with evidence we have from other parts of Nepal where we have worked on community forestry for many 
years. 
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resilience	of	community	forestry	user‐groups	(CFUGs)	during	the	conflict	period	in	
Nepal.		
Fieldwork	for	the	study	was	conducted	in	mid‐2009	in	18	CFUGs	from	6	districts	
where	LFP	worked—one	each	in	the	East	and	West,	two	each	in	the	Terai	and	Mid‐
West	regions	of	Nepal.	We	deliberately	refer	to	these	broad	geographical	areas	
rather	than	Districts	to	help	maintain	anonymity	for	all	actors	involved	in	our	study.	
In	each	district,	one	case	study	was	chosen	from	a	‘least	sensitive’	(state	controlled	
areas),	‘sensitive’	(disputed)	and	‘highly	sensitive’	(controlled	by	the	Maoists)	area	
based	on	the	categorisations	used	by	LFP	during	the	conflict.2		The	goal	was	to	
capture	differences	in	operation	depending	on	the	impact	of	the	insurgency.	Given	
the	desire	to	gain	insight	into	why	CFUGs	were	resilient,	qualitative	interviews	with	
CFUG	members	and	other	local	key	informants	were	conducted	by	a	team	of	
researchers	following	a	semi‐structured	questionnaire.	The	questions	were	
designed	to	elicit	open	ended	answers	and	encouraged	discussion	in	group	
interviews.	The	data	was	analyzed	for	emerging	themes,	issues	already	believed	to	
be	important	based	on	anecdotal	evidence,	and	convergence	as	well	as	divergence	in	
the	narratives	provided	by	the	groups.	A	remarkable	amount	of	convergence	was	
found	in	the	data,	indicating	the	results	are	widely	applicable	to	the	Nepal	context,	
with	enough	divergence	to	feel	confident	the	research	design	was	robust	(Erzberger	
and	Prien,	1997).	Given	the	diversity	of	Nepal	and	uneven	impact	of	the	conflict,	we	
expected	some	divergence	in	the	findings.	
In	 the	 following	 sections,	we	 first	 give	 a	 short	 sketch	 of	 the	 insurgency	 period	 in	
Nepal	 and	 its	 relationship	 with	 development.	 We	 then	 briefly	 discuss	 ‘resilience’	
before	presenting	evidence	from	the	field	about	how	and	why	CFUGs	were	(or	were	
not)	resilient	during	the	conflict.	We	have	divided	the	analysis	 into	 three	sections:	
structure,	strategies	and	tactics	and	vulnerability.	The	first	section	explores	how	the	
structure	 of	 the	 groups	 contributed	 to	 resilience.	 This	 is	 important	 for	 project	
planners	 and	 managers	 globally	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 overall	 structure	 of	 a	
development	intervention	like	community	forestry	can	help	ensure	the	programme	
will	be	able	to	continue	operating	in	the	face	of	violent	conflict.	The	second	section	
details	 the	 strategies	 and	 tactics	 used	 by	 CFUG	 members	 to	 ensure	 they	 could	
																																																								
2	 The	 categories	 of	 low,	 medium	 and	 high	 sensitivity	 were	 developed	 for	 Safe	 and	 Effective	
Development	 in	 Conflict	 (SEDC)	 protocols	 and	 reflect	 the	 perspective	 of	 donors	 and	 service	
providers.	While	this	was	the	original	intention	of	the	categories,	another	logic	might	be	appropriate	
to	understand	how	CFUGs	were	affected	and	the	best	way	to	support	them	in	the	future.	Our	study	
clearly	 revealed	 that	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 CFUGs,	 the	 most	 sensitive	 groups	 in	 terms	 of	
resilience	were	 those	 that	were	caught	between	 the	Maoists	and	 the	Army	(‘sensitive’	under	SEDC	
categorisation).	They	faced	the	biggest	challenges	in	terms	of	operating	and	in	many	cases,	displayed	
the	 most	 creativity	 in	 devising	 coping	 strategies.	 In	 this	 sense,	 we	 understand	 them	 to	 be	 ‘most	
sensitive’.	 The	 pressure	 they	 experienced	 put	 them	 at	 risk,	 but	 perhaps	 also	 offered	 them	
opportunities	to	develop	from	a	governance,	inclusion	and	income	generation	perspective.	The	ways	
the	experience	of	the	conflict	impacted	on	groups	therefore	is	a	key	issue	when	evaluating	resilience	
as	well	as	providing	insights	into	the	everyday	experiences	of	conflict.		
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continue	 functioning.	 This	 contributes	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 how	 the	 conflict	
unfolded	 in	 different	 parts	 of	 Nepal	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 everyday	 livelihood	
strategies	 of	 rural	 residents.	 The	 third	 section	 looks	 at	 vulnerability	 and	 gives	
evidence	from	groups	who	were	not	able	to	continue	functioning	sufficiently	to	be	
called	‘resilient’.	The	findings	in	this	latter	section	help	to	support	some	of	the	key	
messages	emerging	from	the	earlier	sections,	and	also	provide	a	richer	picture	of	the	
everyday	experiences	of	conflict.	
	
Maoist	Insurgency	and	donor‐supported	development	work	in	Nepal		
The	insurgency	(or	so‐called	‘Maoist	People’s	War’)	sought	to	overthrow	the	
monarchy	and	entrenched	feudal	relationships	across	Nepal,	taking	inspiration	from	
the	Shining	Path	in	Peru.	The	insurgency	primarily	engaged	Nepal’s	security	forces	
(police,	and	in	the	latter	stages	of	the	conflict,	the	army),	but	impacted	upon	nearly	
all	people	in	the	country.	Initially,	the	insurgency	began	in	western	Nepal	and	by	
2002	had	spread	across	the	country,	controlling	significant	areas	of	the	rural	
countryside	and	disrupting	most	development	activities	(Hutt,	2004,	Thapa,	2004).	
Local	governance	in	all	conflict	affected	areas	was	transformed	as	political	leaders	
fled	in	fear	of	their	lives,	or	joined	willingly	(or	unwillingly)	the	insurgents.	Some	
places	were	completely	Maoist	controlled	and	in	these	places	they	operated	a	
parallel	state,	or	‘Peoples’	Governments’	(jan	sankar),	(Lund,	2006,	Shneiderman	
and	Turin,	2004b,	Ogura,	2008)	;	other	areas	saw	the	provision	of	services	and	
governance	by	the	local	state	collapse	as	government	employees	were	unable	to	
carry	out	their	duties	(Donini	and	Sharma,	2008).	In	this	context,	there	is	wide‐
spread	evidence	that	community	forestry	user	groups	(CFUGs)	took	up	the	job	of	
providing	services	in	local	areas	and	appeared	to	have	been	able	to	operate	more	
effectively	than	any	other	kind	of	group	(Pokharel,	Ojha,	&	Paudel,	2005).	
By	any	standard,	the	emergence	and	spread	of	the	Maoist	insurgency	between	1996	
and	2006	is	spectacular	(Bonino	and	Donini,	2009).	Using	the	classical	Maoist	tactic	
of	‘encircling	the	cities’	and	forcing	the	police	and	administration	into	district	
headquarters,	the	insurgents	effectively	resisted	stable	government	access	and	
operation	of	development	programmes	throughout	Nepal.	By	mid‐2006,	over	two	
thirds	of	the	approximately	four	thousand	secretaries	of	Village	Development	
Committees	(VDCs)—the	lowest	tier	of	elected	government	in	rural	areas—had	
been	displaced	to	district	headquarters	(Donini	and	Sharma,	2008,	International	
Crisis	Group	(ICG),	2010).		
Although	the	Maoists	were	not	able	to	completely	block	development	programmes,	
they	became	an	important	force	and	gate	keeper,	disrupting	the	implementation	of	
programmes	they	did	not	approve,	or	extracting	funds	from	projects	to	allow	the	
programmes	to	continue.	As	the	conflict	progressed,	the	Maoists	moved	from	a	
position	of	opposing	all	development	programmes	to	a	more	regulatory	approach,	
forcing	programmes	to	comply	with	certain	criteria	and	demands	rather	than	
stopping	their	operation.	The	relationship	between	development	programmes	and	
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the	insurgents	also	depended	on	the	stance	and	personality	of	the	local	party	
commander,	the	funding	agency	supporting	the	programme,	and	the	accountability	
and	inclusiveness	in	the	projects	(Shneiderman	and	Turin,	2004a).		
On	the	basis	of	our	work	and	others,	it	appears	that	development	was	important	for	
the	Maoists	in	at	least	in	three	ways	(Sharma	and	Donini,	2010).	First,	(and	here	the	
parallels	with	the	Shining	Path	are	striking	(Bourque	and	Warren,	1989)),	resisting	
development	was	a	tactic	to	deny	state	presence	in	the	rural	areas	of	Nepal.	Second,	
the	resources	that	came	with	development	programmes	were	often	important	
sources	of	revenue	for	the	Maoists.	This	is	particularly	true	of	the	forestry	sector.	
Third,	the	discourses	of	inclusion	and	equality	used	by	many	of	the	development	
programmes	were	compatible	with	the	Maoist	agenda	of	social	transformation	and	
therefore	disrupting	some	programmes	was	politically	and	ideologically	
problematic	for	local	commanders.	By	exploring	how	and	why	CFUGs	were	resilient	
in	the	conflict,	we	are	able	to	illustrate	some	of	the	subtle	and	to	date	unpublished,	
aspects	of	the	conflict.	Namely,	perspectives	from	rural	residents	on	how	the	
Maoists	sought	to	both	control	but	also	negotiate	and	‘win	over’	the	allegiance	of	the	
rural	population.	
	
Explaining	resilience	in	conflict		
We	 define	 resilience	 as	 the	 ability	 of	 CFUGs	 to	 respond	 to	 conflict	 conditions,	
negotiate	 difficulties	 and	 return	 to	 regular	 functioning	 after	 a	 period	 of	 pressure.	
More	specifically,	we	explore	whether	groups	retained	a	sense	of	identity,	sufficient	
infrastructure	and	shared	purpose	 to	be	able	 to	 resume	 ‘regular’	 functioning	after	
the	 conflict	 ended.	 The	 findings	 from	 the	 research	 showed	 four	 key	 reasons	 for	
resilience.	
First,	the	ability	to	claim	and	demonstrate	fairness	was	crucial	for	groups	to	resist	
demands	by	both	the	conflicting	parties	(Maoists	and	the	Nepal	Army).	Fairness	in	
CFUG	practices	helped	keep	all	members	committed	to	the	group	and	to	overcome	
problems	they	encountered.		By	ensuring	their	practices	were	just,	CFUGs	were	able	
to	 claim	 the	moral	 high	 ground	 and	 use	 that	 as	 a	 strong	 platform	 from	which	 to	
negotiate	operating	space.		
Second,	 community	 forestry	 is	 seen	 as	 community	 owned,	 neutral,	 equitable	 and	
pro‐poor;	thus	benefiting	all	members	and	not	a	part	of	the	state.	Importantly,	while	
CFUGs	 have	 support	 from	 both	 donors	 and	 the	 state,	 community	 forestry	 is	 not	
believed	 to	 be	 imposed	 by	 outsiders.	 CFUGs	 gave	 villagers	 an	 identity	 that	 was	
neutral	and	distinct	 from	the	other	more	politically	problematic	 identities	 in	rural	
areas	 such	 as	 caste,	 ethnicity,	 class	 or	 political	 party	 membership	 (Nightingale,	
2011).	 This	 neutral	 identity	 helped	 to	 protect	 the	 group	 and	 its	 members	 in	
particular	contexts.	
Third,	community	 forestry	user‐groups	both	own	and	 control	 significant	 financial	
and	physical	(forestry)	resources.	These	resources	were	needed	by	the	Nepal	Army	
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and	 the	 Maoists	 and	 to	 ensure	 they	 had	 access	 to	 them,	 both	 parties	 needed	 to	
negotiate	with	the	CFUGs.	Here	the	distinction	made	by	political	ecologists	between	
control	over	and	access	to	resources	is	crucial.	Control	over	resources	indicates	legal	
rights	 and	 control	 over	 decision	 making	 in	 everyday	 practice,	 whereas	 access	
indicates	 the	 ability	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 and	 use	 forest	 resources	 (Ribot	 and	Peluso,	
2003,	Peet	and	Watts,	2004).	Our	study	found	in	some	areas	CFUGs	lost	control	over	
their	 accounts	 or	 their	 forest	 resources	or	 both,	 but	were	 able	 to	 retain	 access	 to	
them.		
Four,	 all	 the	 groups	 interviewed	 expressed	 a	 strong	 determination	 to	 continue	
actively	 operating.	 This	 commitment	 to	 the	 CFUG	 led	 to	 a	 number	 of	 creative	
strategies	to	cope	with	pressure	from	the	conflicting	parties.	It	also	led	to	strategies	
to	 retain	 access	 to	 resources	 even	when	 groups	 relinquished	 various	 elements	 of	
their	 control	 over	 them.	While	 in	 some	 respects	 these	 groups	 seem	 to	 have	 lost	
control	 over	 their	 forest,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 their	
creative	 strategies	 contributed	 to	 the	 long	 term	 resilience	 of	 the	 group	 by	
maintaining	access.		
In	order	to	illustrate	and	support	these	conclusions,	we	now	turn	to	the	structural	
features	 of	 community	 forestry	 as	 a	 programme	 and	 CFUGs	 as	 institutions	 that	
helped	 contribute	 to	 their	 resilience	 before	 exploring	 some	 of	 their	 creative	
strategies.	
1.	Structures	of	resilience	
Community	 forestry	as	a	programme,	and	CFUGs	as	institutions,	have	a	number	of	
structural	or	design	features	that	contributed	to	their	resilience	during	the	conflict.	
It	is	important	to	stress,	however,	that	these	structural	features	are	not	adequate	in	
themselves.	 The	 most	 important	 finding	 from	 this	 study	 is	 that	 CFUG	 members	
displayed	 remarkable	 creativity	 and	 commitment	 to	 operating	 and	 it	 was	 only	
through	 their	 daily	 practices	 and	 use	 of	 these	 institutional	 features	 that	 the	
structure	 itself	 was	 meaningful	 in	 promoting	 resilience	 (explored	 in	 the	 second	
section	below).	However,	we	also	 found	 that	groups	who	were	very	weak	 in	 their	
structure—particularly	in	proper	accounting	procedures—lost	resilience	faster	than	
those	 who	 were	 sound.	 We	 explore	 this	 more	 fully	 below	 under	 points	 of	
vulnerability	 (third	 section).	 On	 a	 positive	 note,	 many	 groups	 appear	 to	 have	
become	stronger	as	a	consequence	of	pressure	from	the	conflict.		
Sense	of	Ownership	
Community	 forestry	 operational	 plans	 and	 constitutions	 give	 user	 groups	 a	 large	
measure	of	autonomy	in	decision‐making	and	in	regulating	the	harvesting	of	forest	
products.	The	forest	land	technically	is	owned	by	the	state,	but	CFUGs	have	the	right	
to	control	all	resources	and	revenues	generated	from	it	(Khadka,	2010,	Nightingale,	
2005,	Ojha	et	al.,	2008,	Thoms,	2008,	Timsina	and	Paudel,	2002).	Groups	therefore	
feel	a	great	deal	of	ownership	over	the	forest	and	believe	the	CFUG	is	‘their’	group.	
The	autonomy	given	by	the	design	of	community	forestry	is	thus	a	key	reason	why	
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CFUGs	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 ‘local’	 groups	 and	 not	 part	 of	 the	 state	 or	 a	 donor	
programme.	
During	 the	conflict	 the	user	groups	 thus	asserted	 that	 they	were	 local	groups	 that	
had	emerged	from	the	grassroots,	and	that	they	worked	for	the	needs	of	everyone	in	
their	 communities.	 They	 were	 said	 to	 be	 run	 by	 local	 people	 (and	 not)	 by	
government	employees.		This	was	a	very	difficult	claim	for	either	the	Maoists	or	the	
Nepal	Army	to	counter	and	was	a	key	part	of	many	groups’	negotiating	strategies.	
Many	groups	were	aware	that	this	characteristic	was	important	for	their	ability	 to	
operate	in	conflict:	
It	was	easier	for	us	to	work	because	we	feel	that	it	(the	community	forest]	is	
ours;	it	belongs	to	us…	The	situation	might	be	different	where	user	groups	
are	extremely	rich,	but	I	am	talking	about	our	area	(where	user	groups	are	
not	so	rich),	where	people	directly	implement	the	activities.	Had	external	
NGOs,	INGOs	and	foreigners	intervened	in	our	activities,	the	Maoists	would	
have	stopped	the	activities…	(Western	region,	disputed)	
The	 study	 also	 found	 examples	where	user	 groups	were	 seen	 as	 belonging	 to	 the	
local	people	whereas	the	district	forest	office	was	not.	For	example,	
The	community	forestry	building…	[was]	in	the	same	compound	as	the	
district	forest	office’s	range	post.	The	Maoists	[who	included	user	group	
members]	blew	up	the	range	post	but	not	the	community	forestry	building…	
(Terai	region,	Maoist‐controlled	area)	
Here,	the	group	was	able	to	save	the	CFUG	building,	but	a	government	forestry	office	
building	in	the	same	compound	was	destroyed	as	it	was	considered	part	of	the	state.	
In	 the	 narrative,	 the	 group	 members	 said	 the	 Maoists	 wanted	 to	 blow	 up	 the	
building,	 but	 user‐group	 members—who	 were	 also	 Maoists—convinced	 the	
commanders	 to	 leave	 their	 building	 alone.	 Overall,	 the	 structure	 of	 community	
forestry	that	gives	CFUGs	autonomy	and	control	over	resources,	also	allowed	user‐
groups	 to	 assert	 that	 they	 ‘own’	 the	 group	 and	 this	 characteristic	 helped	 to	 give	
them	a	platform	from	which	to	resist	interference	with	their	groups.	
	
Inclusion,	Livelihoods	and	pro‐poor	practices	
Closely	 related	 to	 the	above	point,	 the	community	 forestry	programme	 is	 founded	
on	principles	of	inclusion.	LFP	as	a	project	has	worked	to	ensure	representation	and	
to	 encourage	 participation	 on	 the	 part	 of	marginalised	 community	members.	 The	
structural	commitment	to	 ‘pro‐poor’	policies	including	access	to	resources	and	the	
use	of	CFUG	funds	for	pro‐poor	projects,	was	vital	to	the	claims	made	by	CFUGs	that	
their	 goals	were	 compatible	with	 those	 of	 the	Maoists.	 Thus,	 the	 core	 researcher	
from	 the	Mid‐West	 summarized	 the	 interview	material	 from	 a	 sensitive	 group	 as	
follows:	
The	warring	side	[Maoists]	were	positive	towards	CFUGs	as	they	found	its	rules,	
regulations,	and	inclusive	structure	relevant	and	justified,	and	quite	similar	to	
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that	of	theirs.	This	helped	a	lot	in	the	management	of	the	community	forest	and	
in	initiating	any	dialogue	with	them	(Mid‐Western	region,	disputed	area)		
In	 many	 cases,	 the	 CFUGs	 were	 able	 to	 show	 that	 they	 provided	 all	 community	
members	with	equitable	access	to	resources	and	CFUG	assets.	This	was	a	claim	that	
in	most	places	the	Maoists	were	unable	to	counter	and	ultimately	respected.	It	was	
also	difficult	for	the	Army	to	block	or	argue	against	inclusive,	pro‐poor	activities	that	
support	rural	development	 in	remote	areas.	These	activities	are	a	 core	part	of	 the	
state’s	development	agenda	and	for	the	Army	to	actively	work	against	it	would	have	
been	 disastrous.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 CFUGs	 had	 the	moral	 high	 ground.	 In	 some	
places	 the	 Army	 did	 make	 the	 operation	 of	 CFUGs	 very	 difficult	 and	 members	
created	 a	 variety	 of	 strategies	 to	 overcome	 these	 problems,	 but	 as	 a	 centralised	
policy,	the	Army	command	could	not	be	seen	to	halt	activities	that	were	so	central	to	
people’s	livelihoods.		
Structures	that	encourage	leadership	and	negotiation	skills	
Respect	for	community	forestry,	however,	was	not	necessarily	granted	immediately	
or	easily	by	the	conflicting	parties.	Rather,	CFUGs	had	to	engage	in	dialogue	with	the	
Maoists	and/or	the	Army	in	order	to	convince	them	that	the	CFUG	was	a	legitimate	
local	 organisation,	 politically	 neutral	 and	working	 for	 the	 needs	 of	 all	 community	
members.	 Such	 skills	 appear	 to	 be	 ‘learned’	 through	 community	 forestry.	
Structurally,	CFUGs	encourage	public	participation	by	members	and	require	group	
leaders	to	cultivate	consensus	in	the	group.	CFUGs	also	have	to	negotiate	with	other	
nearby	 groups	 or	 District	 Forest	 Officers,	 all	 of	 which	 gives	 them	 significant	
experience	 in	 negotiation	 and	 consensus	 building	 with	 a	 variety	 of	 different	
stakeholders,	 even	 if	 some	real	exclusions	continue	to	plague	 the	programme	as	a	
whole	 (see	 Khadka,	 2010,	 Neupane,	 2003,	 Nightingale,	 2006,	 Nightingale,	 2005).	
User‐group	members	expressed	directly	how	these	skills	were	useful	to	them	during	
the	conflict	by	giving	 them	the	confidence	to	stand	up	to	the	Army	or	the	Maoists.		
For	example	one	group	said,	
The	Maoists	opposed	our	system	of	pay	for	fuelwood	and	timber	and	told	users	
that	you	don't	need	to	pay	…	we	discussed	this	issue	and	all	users	said	the	rules	
are	 for	 us,	 for	 our	 own	 benefits	 we	 didn’t	 need	 to	 be	 afraid	 from	 external	
threats….	We	became	strong	on	our	decisions	and	implementation	[of	the	fees].	
The	decisions	were	also	 favourable	 for	Maoist	 families,	 their	 family	members	
were	also	supportive	on	the	decisions.	(Western	region,	Maoist	controlled	area)		
Inclusive	practices	that	underpin	LFP’s	approach	to	community	forestry	have	clearly	
been	 internalized	 by	 CFUGs	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 the	 group	 developed	 and	
maintained	integrity	and	resilience.	
The	LFP	and	other	donor	programmes	have	been	concerned	about	the	tendency	for	
elites	 to	dominate	CFUGs	and	have	sought	 to	counter	balance	 that	by	encouraging	
groups	 to	 give	 leadership	 positions	 and	 a	 voice	 to	 women,	 the	 poor	 and	 other	
disadvantaged	 people	 within	 groups.	 During	 the	 conflict,	 however,	 we	 have	
	 9
evidence	 that	 this	 so‐called	 ‘elite	 capture’	 often	worked	 to	 their	 advantage.	 Elites	
CFUGs	 members	 often	 had	 social	 capital	 and	 networks	 within	 the	 Army	 or	 the	
Maoist	commanders	(or	both)	and	were	able	to	utilise	these	skills	and	networks	to	
facilitate	their	negotiations.	For	example,	
The	 chairperson	 was	 very	 good	 in	 negotiating	 with	 police,	 army	 and	 the	
Maoists.	When	approached	by	the	Maoists	he	would	show	them	our	records	to	
demonstrate	 that	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 committee	 were	 transparent.	 (Mid‐
western	region,	disputed	area)		
Here	we	want	to	emphasize	that	the	negotiating	skills	and	networks	of	CFUG	leaders	
in	 many	 places	 developed	 from	 community	 forestry	 (Kharel,	 1993).	 There	 is	
therefore	a	mixed	pattern	of	CFUGs	being	dominated	by	people	who	already	have	
significant	 social	 power,	 as	 well	 as	 community	 forestry	 being	 a	 context	 wherein	
people	gain	social	power	by	virtue	of	managing	the	groups.	
Based	on	this	evidence,	we	conclude	that	three	main	structural	elements	gave	user	
groups	 bargaining	 power	 and	 thus	 resilience.	 First,	 community	 forestry	 has	
developed	group	members’	abilities	to	negotiate	with	elites;	much	of	this	confidence	
to	 speak	 out	 has	 been	 learned	 from	 the	 functioning	 of	 their	 groups,	which	 has	 in	
part	 been	 promoted	 by	 donors,	 and	 in	 part	 is	 integral	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 the	
programme.	 Second,	 the	 proper	 implementation	 of	 community	 forestry,	 including	
open	 and	 clear	 decision‐making,	 transparent	 accounts	 and	 group	 consensus	
building,	were	vital	for	their	ability	to	project	a	positive	outward	image.	Third,	the	
social	 networks	 of	 many	 user	 group	 office	 holders	 with	 key	 members	 of	 the	
conflicting	parities	gave	them	access	to	commanders	on	both	sides.		
Financial	Transparency		
Another	 key	 structural	 aspect	 was	 user	 groups’	 generally	 open	 and	 transparent	
financial	 systems.	 All	 groups	 have	 to	 present	 their	 annual	 accounts	 with	 a	 clear	
record	 of	 the	 transactions	 to	 their	 annual	 general	 assemblies	 wherein	 every	
household	 is	 expected	 to	 have	 at	 least	 one	 representative.	 The	 importance	 of	
transparent	 functioning,	 and	 in	particular	 financial	 transparency,	was	 consistently	
mentioned	by	respondents	as	a	key	reason	for	user	groups’	resilience:	
The	Maoists	did	not	suspect	us	due	to	the	transparency	of	our	accounts.	We	
used	our	funds	to	build	culverts,	gravel	our	road,	plant	seedlings,	erect	
fences…	for	our	revolving	fund	and	to	fund	goat	raising	by	poor	households.	
Seeing	this,	they	did	not	obstruct	us...	(Terai	region,	disputed	area)	
The	transparent	operation	of	user	group	accounts	allowed	CFUG	leaders	to	back	up	
their	 claims	 that	 they	 were	 engaged	 in	 pro‐poor	 activities	 and	 were	 using	 their	
revenues	for	appropriate	local	development	activities.	In	many	places	this	appeased	
the	Maoists,	 although	most	user	 groups	 still	 had	 to	 give	 forced	donations.	Groups	
from	all	 the	different	regions	gave	examples	of	contesting	 these	donations	(locally	
known	as	 ‘taxes’).	For	example,	user	groups	 in	the	east	of	 the	country	managed	to	
negotiate	 a	 lower	 rate	 of	 forced	 donation	 by	 negotiating	 collectively	 through	
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FECOFUN3.	 In	 2005,	 the	 Maoists	 had	 demanded	 30%	 of	 user	 group	 funds.	
Individually	 the	 groups	 had	 been	 unable	 to	 resist	 these	 demands,	 whilst	 taking	
collective	 action	 had	 put	 them	 in	 a	 stronger	 position	 and	 enabled	 them	 to	
successfully	negotiate.	
	
The	 written	 nature	 of	 operational	 plans	 and	 constitutions,	 lists	 of	 members	 and	
records	of	decisions,	activities	and	 finances	meant	they	could	be	shown	to	anyone	
who	questioned	their	credibility.	There	are	other	power	issues	associated	with	the	
emphasis	 on	written	 records	within	 community	 forestry	 (Nightingale,	 2005,	Ojha,	
2008),	 but	 during	 the	 conflict,	 such	 records	 proved	 to	 be	 vital	 for	 retaining	
operating	space.	
	
Group	consensus	building	
Another	 important	 structural	 feature	 of	 user	 groups	 is	 that	 major	 decisions	 are	
supposed	 to	 be	 reached	 by	 consensus	 at	 public	 meetings	 in	 line	 with	 traditional	
village	systems	that	are	seen	as	‘informal’	and	‘just’	(Gellner	and	Hachhethu,	2008).	
Indeed,	the	commitment	to	 ‘kurra	miloune’	 (compromise	or	consensus	building)	in	
Nepal	is	a	pervasive	cultural	norm	in	any	kind	of	negotiation.	This	kind	of	decision	
making	 strengthens	 group	 cohesion	 and	 in	most	 cases	 people	 will	 abide	 by	 such	
decisions	even	if	they	disagree	(Joshi	et	al.,	1997).	
	
Many	user	groups	told	how	group	cohesion	was	very	important	for	enabling	groups	
to	continue	working	during	the	armed	conflict.	It	was	also	clear	that	pressures	from	
outside	actually	promoted	user	group	cohesion.	It	was	said	that	groups	who	failed	to	
stick	 together	 during	 the	 conflict	 were	 forced	 to	 cease	 operating,	whilst	 cohesive	
CFUGs	were	much	stronger.	
They	[Maoists]	came	to	us	for	30%	[of	our	fund]...	We	called	a	general	
assembly…	and	decided	that	we	could	not	give	30%…	there	were	some	
threats…	but	we	were	not	afraid	as	we	were	united...	(Eastern	region,	
disputed	area)	
All	the	groups	made	it	quite	clear	that	group	cohesion,	along	with	transparency,	was	
vital	 and	 in	 the	 below	 section	 on	 tactical	 strategies,	 evidence	 of	 the	 various	ways	
that	CFUGs	helped	to	promote	group	cohesion	is	clear.	The	structural	commitment	
in	 community	 forestry	 to	 issues	 of	 transparency	 and	 inclusive	 participation	 thus	
contributed	to	resilience.	Development	programmes	that	seek	to	promote	inclusion	
and	transparency,	therefore,	are	more	likely	to	be	able	to	operate	in	conflict.	Indeed,	
in	Nepal	such	principles	were	 institutionalised	as	 ‘good	practice’	 through	Safe	and	
Effective	Development	in	Conflict	guidelines.	
																																																								
3 FECOFUN is a national federation of community forestry user groups. It acts as a civil society association 
to lobby for user group rights and works through a network of regional and local branches. 
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Donor	strategies	
As	the	intensity	of	the	armed	conflict	heightened,	many	development	programmes	
promoted	ways	of	working	that	mitigated	conflict	and	minimised	risks.	Programmes	
supported	by	the	UK’s	Department	for	International	Development	(DFID),	including	
LFP,	encouraged	their	staff	and	partners	to	work	according	to:	
a)	the	Safe	and	Effective	Development	in	Conflict	(SEDC)	protocols,	which	call	
for	engaging	 in	dialogue	with	the	conflicting	parties,	maintaining	neutrality,	
and	working	in	ways	that	direct	more	resources	to	the	local	and	grassroots	
levels;	and	
b)	 the	 basic	 operating	 guidelines	 (BOGs)	 of	 Nepal’s	 development	 partners	
that	 set	 out	 the	 standards	 expected	 of	 their	 projects	 and	 staff	 (including	
transparency	 and	 accountability	 in	 the	 use	 of	 resources,	 zero	 tolerance	 of	
corruption	and	respect	for	all	people);	and	the	minimum	conditions	required	
from	political	and	military	forces	(freedom	from	threat	or	actual	violence,	no	
misdirection	of	project	resources,	freedom	of	movement).		
While	certainly	there	are	anecdotal	accounts	of	development	workers	paying	‘taxes’	
to	 the	 Maoists,	 engaging	 in	 egregious	 corruption	 beyond	 this	 payment	 was	
considered	hazardous	 for	 individuals.	There	 is	evidence	that	LFP’s	commitment	 to	
these	 ways	 of	 working	 along	 with	 other	 programme	 structural	 features	 were	
important	for	promoting	user	group	resilience	in	the	following	three	ways:	
 
First,	the	use	of	a	decentralised	network	of	local	actors	(animators)	as	service	
providers	(local	NGOs	and	other	organisations)	to	implement	LFP	programme	
activities	meant	that	it	was	able	to	continue	providing	support	even	to	remote	
groups	throughout	the	conflict.	Respondents	from	adjacent	user	groups	in	a	
disputed	area	in	the	West	stressed	the	importance	and	skill	of	a	local	service	
provider.	
[The	Maoists]	asked	all	user	groups	to	pay	40%	of	their	income…	But	the	
animator	said	that	the	programme	was	working	for	poor	people,	women	
and	Dalits	to	help	them	increase	their	incomes...	He	said,	“if	you	see	
something	undesirable	happening	and	it	is	supported	by	us,	then	you	can	
stop	our	work	and	we	will	send	the	programme	away.”	Afterwards,	the	
Maoists	put	no	more	pressure	on	the	animator	[and	therefore	the	
programme	was	able	to	continue]	(Western	region,	disputed	area)	
	
Second,	one	of	LFP’s	strategies	was	to	build	the	confidence	of	service	providers	and	
their	field	staff	to	continue	working	by	orienting	them	in	conflict	sensitive	
development	and	the	BOGs.	These	approaches	were	then	disseminated	to	the	user	
groups	by	the	service	providers.	Many	user	groups	appear	to	have	taken	up	conflict	
sensitive	communication	and	impartiality	strategies	such	as	informing	the	
conflicting	parties	of	their	meetings.	They	avoided	“being	‘for	or	against’	any	
conflicting	party	and	tried	to	maintain	impartiality”	(West,	State‐controlled	area).	
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They	also	took	any	opportunity	to	emphasise	their	transparency,	neutrality	and	
openness	to	gain	operating	space	and	maintain	access	to	their	resources.	
Importantly,	neutrality	was	a	claim	successfully	made	by	user	groups,	though	it	did	
not	necessarily	mean	they	were	politically	neutral.	
	
Third,	LFP	and	DFID’s	commitment	to	poverty	reduction,	tackling	social	exclusion,	
perceived	political	neutrality,	and	engaging	in	dialogue	with	both	conflicting	parties	
helped	promote	a	positive	image	for	user	groups	in	LFP’s	areas.	The	Maoists	viewed	
the	activities	of	international	development	partners	as	acceptable	as	long	as	their	
reasons	for	operating	were	consistent	with	the	Maoist	agenda.	DFID’s	perceived	
neutral	stance	in	the	conflict4,	combined	with	their	promotion	of	grassroots	and	
appropriate	local	institutions,	was	vital	to	the	image	user	groups	were	able	to	
project.	This	was	in	contrast	to	some	development	partners	who	did	not	maintain	
perceived	political	neutrality.	
	
From	 this	 account	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 community	 forestry	 helped	
support	 CFUGs	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways	 but	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 say	 which	 structural	
aspects	 were	 more	 important	 than	 others.	 In	 part	 this	 is	 because	 of	 the	 uneven	
nature	of	 the	conflict	across	 the	study	sites—the	groups	were	not	 facing	the	same	
pressures—but	 also	 because	 in	 many	 cases	 it	 appears	 that	 structural	 elements	
combined	 conferred	 resilience.	 Financial	 transparency	 was	 not	 sufficient	 without	
good	 leadership	 and	 consensus	 in	 the	 group,	 for	 example;	 and	 the	 political	
neutrality	of	DFID	as	well	as	the	decentralised	nature	of	their	programme	delivery	
were	 both	 required	 for	 local	 service	 providers	 to	 continue	 supporting	CFUGs.	We	
now	turn	to	how	CFUGs	used	these	structural	features	to	their	advantage	as	part	of	a	
suite	of	creative	tactics.	
	
2.	Strategies	of	Resilience	
As	a	community	forestry	user	group	we	needed	to	be	active…	We	spoke	to	
the	district	chapter	of	FECOFUN…	and	we	were	encouraged…	Had	we	gone	
inactive	because	of	the	conflict…	we	would	not	have	been	able	to	maintain	
our	saving	and	credit	fund…	and…	maybe	people	would	have	destroyed	the	
forest	...	(Eastern	region,	disputed	area)	
In	 this	 section,	 we	 detail	 the	 creative,	 tactical	 strategies	 groups	 used	 to	 continue	
operating.	Not	all	groups	used	all	 these	strategies	and	many	groups	changed	 their	
strategies	 as	 the	 conflict	 progressed.	 But	 rather	 than	 looking	 for	 empirical	
consistency,	 we	 believe	 this	 illustrates	 more	 general	 conceptual	 points.	 To	 have	
resilience,	 groups	 need	 to	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 learn	 and	 respond	 in	 a	 flexible	
manner	to	conditions	that	are	changing	and	unpredictable.	It	also	helps	to	add	depth	
																																																								
4 The UK deliberately took a neutral political stance in Nepal, unlike the USA (via George Bush) which 
branded the Maoists terrorists. USAID was more or less forced to cease operating in rural areas as a result. 
	 13
to	the	issue	of	why	groups	were	resilient	during	the	conflict,	and	gives	insight	into	
the	everyday	experience	of	living	in	conflict.	
Political	and	social	diversity	
As	mentioned,	most	user	groups	that	retained	high	levels	of	resilience	were	careful	
to	remain	neutral,	and	perhaps	most	resourcefully,	they	used	the	different	political	
affiliations	of	 their	members	 to	 claim	 their	neutrality.	 For	 example,	 one	Mid‐West	
user	group	told	how,	if	they	needed	to	travel	to	the	district	centre,	they	brought	with	
them	 people	 from	 different	 parties,	 and	 if	 stopped	 by	 the	 Maoists,	 their	 Maoist	
member	could	vouch	for	them	and	similarly,	if	stopped	by	the	Nepal	Army,	members	
of	the	mainstream	political	parties	would	identify	the	others	as	‘CFUG	members’.		
	
Here,	we	see	the	way	that	CFUGs	gave	villagers	a	neutral,	defensible	identity.	Maoist	
affiliated	 members	 can	 be	 simply	 ‘CFUG	 members’	 when	 in	 the	 context	 of	 CFUG	
business.	We	want	to	be	clear	that	we	do	not	believe	that	CFUGs	were	‘harbouring’	
Maoists,	 rather,	 people	 in	 rural	 localities	 have	multiple	 identities	 and	 at	 different	
moments	 in	 time	 and	 in	 different	 spaces	 they	 move	 between	 these	 identities	
(Nightingale,	2011).	When	doing	CFUG	business,	the	people	in	question	were	‘CFUG	
members’	 and	 nothing	 else	 at	 that	 particular	moment.	 The	 groups	 also	 sought	 to	
demonstrate	that	they	were	socially	inclusive.	As	explained	above,	most	CFUGs	and	
the	 donors	 supporting	 them	 have	 socially	 inclusive	 policies	 that	 target	 women,	
Dalits	and	 the	members	of	other	 traditionally	marginalised	groups	 to	ensure	 their	
participation	 (Nightingale,	 2002,	Khadka,	 2010,	Gilmour	 and	Fisher,	 1991,	 Kharel,	
1993,	 Hobley,	 1996,	 Ojha	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 Given	 the	 Maoists	 agenda	 to	 overturn	
entrenched	hierarchies	in	Nepalese	society,	the	inclusiveness	of	CFUGs	fit	well	with	
their	agenda.	 It	was	almost	 impossible	 for	 local	Maoist	commanders	 to	shut	down	
groups	 that	 were	 considered	 ‘equitable’	 by	 their	 members	 without	 risking	
undermining	their	political	agenda.	
	
Opportunities	for	dialogue	
One	of	the	most	common	strategies	used	by	user	groups	was	to	engage	in	dialogue	
with	the	conflicting	parties.	They	sought	to	negotiate	operating	space	and	in	many	
instances	 this	was	 successful,	 even	 if	 the	user	 groups	 lost	 some	degree	of	 control	
over	 their	 resources.	 Yet	 by	 giving	 up	 some	 control,	 we	 argue	 that	 our	 findings	
suggest	the	groups’	main	concern	was	to	maintain	access	to	their	forests	and	their	
funds,	 and	 where	 possible,	 to	 retain	 operating	 autonomy.	 Such	 strategies	 have	
strong	 antecedents	 in	 the	 cultural	 commitment	 to	 ‘compromise’	 (kurra	miloune)	
that	runs	across	Nepalese	society.		
	
In	 almost	 all	 the	 study	 areas,	 the	 user	 groups	 engaged	 in	 dialogue	with	 both	 the	
Maoists	 and	 the	Nepal	 Army,	with	 the	 extent	 to	which	 they	 had	 contact	with	 one	
side	 or	 the	 other	 depending	 on	 who	 controlled	 the	 area.	 User	 groups	 used	 their	
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connections	with	the	conflicting	parties	to	help	them	negotiate,	and	they	often	built	
relationships	as	the	conflict	progressed.	
We	told	them	that	they	should	not	disturb	our	user	group’s	work…	we	used	
our	contact…	we	knew	the	person…	so	that	helped.	It	is	easy	to	negotiate	
with	known	people…	(Western	region,	disputed	area)	
Many	 of	 the	 groups	 reported	 that	 the	 Maoists	 were	 easier	 to	 negotiate	 with,	
although	the	study	found	evidence	pointing	to	difficult	negotiations	with	both	sides.	
We	also	had	a	discussion	with	[the	Maoists]…	and	told	them	that	we,	and	not	
them,	would	decide	what	was	to	be	done	with	fund	allocation,	etc.	That	was	
the	decision	we	made	by	consensus.	Instead	of	being	affected	by	them	and	
their	decisions,	we	impressed	them	with	our	community	development	
activities.	(Western	region,	Maoist‐controlled	area)	
In	 the	 Terai	 a	 number	 of	 strategies	 emerged	 in	 one	 group	 including:	 holding	
meetings	 and	 dialogue	 with	 both	 sides	 to	 keep	 them	 informed	 about	 user	 group	
activities;	 placing	 Maoist	 members	 on	 committees	 and	 in	 special	 interest	 sub‐
groups;	 and	allowing	 the	Maoists	 to	 collect	 fuelwood	 free	of	 cost	 in	 the	beginning	
and	at	50%	of	the	standard	rate	later.Thus,	this	group	made	concessions	on	control	
by	placing	Maoists	on	its	committee,	but	as	 the	conflict	progressed,	 the	users	took	
some	 control	 back	 by	 charging	 for	 fuelwood;compromises	 which	 helped	 retain	
access	to	their	resources.	
What	 is	 of	 interest	 here	 is	 that	 groups	 tried,	 with	 varying	 degrees	 of	 success,	 to	
negotiate	and	compromise	with	both	conflict	parties.	In	the	above	quotes,	it	is	also	
crucial	 to	 note	 that	 the	 link	 between	 CFUG	 Maoist	 members	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
group	was	vital	for	convincing	the	Maoists	that	the	group	should	retain	control	over	
their	 management	 decisions.	 Such	 personal	 connections	 are	 the	 way	 business	 is	
usually	achieved	 in	Nepal.	Having	 ‘your	own	person’	 (afno	manche)	 in	an	office	or	
key	 position	 is	 vital	 to	 whether	 or	 not	 ordinary	 citizens	 are	 able	 to	 successfully	
negotiate	with	government	offices	or	obtain	jobs	(Bista,	1991,	Dahal,	2008,	Gellner	
et	al.,	1997).	The	conflict	period	was	no	different	in	this	regard,	and	people	sought	to	
create	and	mobilise	personal	connections	to	negotiate	with	the	conflicting	parties.	
	
Eating	together	
One	of	the	reasons	that	the	user	groups	found	it	easier	to	negotiate	with	the	Maoists	
was	the	opportunities	they	had	to	sit	and	talk	with	them.	Eating	together	has	always	
been	an	important	symbolic	activity	in	rural	Nepal.	The	Maoists	demanded	food	and	
hospitality	 to	 break	 down	 historical	 caste,	 gender	 and	 ethnicity	 hierarchies;	 to	
support	their	movement;	and	to	assert	their	authority.	Yet	these	demands	were	not	
necessarily	straightforward	acts	of	dominance	as	once	the	visitors	were	seated	and	
given	food,	many	villagers	were	able	to	reassert	their	power	(see	also	Pettigrew	and	
Shneiderman,	2004,	Pettigrew,	forthcoming).	These	moments	at	the	hearth	became	
an	opportunity	to	speak	to	the	Maoists	about	their	activities.	
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The	Maoists	came	regularly	to	eat...	We	used	to	discuss	about	the	benefits	of	
our	forest	and	how	we	were	supporting	the	poor.	As	poor	communities	are	
their	target	to	expand	their	party	membership…	so	they	did	not	interfere	or	
try	to	close	down	our	activities.	(Western	region,	disputed	area)	
Meal	times	and	the	private	spaces	of	homes	therefore	became	opportunities	for	user	
group	members	to	expound	on	the	positive	aspects	of	community	forestry.	Several	
groups	created	negotiating	space	by	inviting	the	Maoists	to	come	and	eat	with	them.	
We	said	to	them…	“why	send	us	letters…	stating	the	amount	you	need?…	You	
can	come	and	eat…	and	we	can	discuss”	(Western	region,	Maoist‐controlled	
area)	
	
The	ways	that	the	Maoists	brought	the	conflict	into	the	private	spaces	of	people’s	
everyday	lives	has	been	amply	demonstrated	by	other	studies	(Nightingale,	2011,	
Shneiderman,	2003,	Shneiderman	and	Turin,	2004b,	Shneiderman,	2009,	Pettigrew,	
2008).	They	show	not	only	how	the	Maoists	insisted	on	access	to	such	spaces,	but	
also	how	villagers	often	felt	more	empowered	to	assert	their	own	agendas	literally	
at	their	hearth	sides.		But	this	account	here	shows	how	rural	residents	turned	such	
tactics	‘back’	on	the	Maoists	and	actively	invited	the	Maoists	into	the	spaces	of	their	
homes	in	order	to	capitalise	on	the	bargaining	power	such	locations	afforded	them.		
Holding	meetings	
The	private	spaces	of	homes	provided	one	sort	of	space	to	negotiate,	whereas	many	
groups	found	public	assemblies	a	much	more	difficult	place	to	conduct	the	everyday	
business	of	forest	governance.	The	Maoists	and	the	Army	placed	demands	on	how,	
when	 or	where	 local	 residents	 assembled,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	many	 groups	modified	
their	functioning	to	ensure	continued	access	to	their	resources.	The	most	common	
modifications	 were	 shifting	 decision	 making	 to	 all	 users	 or	 changing	 where	 and	
when	decision	makers	met.	
	
Some	groups	moved	decision	making	from	their	executive	committees	to	the	entire	
group	to	demonstrate	the	cohesion	of	members	and	ensure	that	no	member	could	
contest	a	decision:	
We	emphasized	group	consensus	rather	than	the	committee’s	decisions…	all	
the	decisions	were	made	through	assemblies	or	by	consensus.	(Western	
region,	State‐controlled	area)	
More	 often,	 executive	 committees	 became	 more	 central,	 as	 the	 holding	 of	 large	
meetings	was	disapproved	of	by	 the	Nepal	Army.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	most	 common	
strategy	 was	 to	 find	 sheltered,	 private	 spaces	 to	 hold	 meetings	 to	 provide	 some	
measure	of	safety:	
[At	that	time]	it	could	be	dangerous	to	gather	outside	for	group	meetings.	
But	we	used	to	sit	in	a	small	hut.	In	spite	of	the	fear,	user	groups	operated.	
Both	conflicting	parties	knew	the	role	of	community	forestry	in	protecting	
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our	village	from	the	danger	of	the	river	changing	course.	(Terai	region,	
disputed	area)	
Another	strategy	was	to	change	the	date	of	meetings,	often	at	the	last	minute,	so	that	
the	Maoists	(or	less	often,	the	Nepal	Army)	were	less	likely	to	disrupt	them.	
	
As	the	conflict	progressed,	many	groups	adopted	SEDC‐type	strategies	and	sought	to	
keep	their	activities	as	open	as	possible,	while	still	trying	to	maintain	some	privacy	
to	debate	 their	 affairs.	 These	kinds	of	 strategies	 give	 insight	 into	how	 the	 conflict	
affected	people’s	everyday	lives	in	rural	Nepal.	The	ability	to	gather,	plan	and	hold	
assemblies	of	any	kind	became	difficult	if	not	dangerous	in	most	places.	In	some	of	
the	Maoist	 controlled	 areas,	 such	 assemblies	were	welcomed,	 provided	 they	were	
held	 as	 part	 of	 ‘People’s	 Governments’	 activities.	 What	 is	 most	 striking	 is	 the	
tenacity	with	which	people	sought	a	variety	of	creative	strategies	to	maintain	access	
to	vital	forest	resources	and	continue	with	the	business	of	everyday	governance	of	
the	CFUG.	We	now	turn	to	some	of	 the	more	surprising	and	resourceful	strategies	
employed.	
	
Other	creative	strategies	
During	the	conflict,	many	users	found	it	difficult	to	go	to	their	forest	to	collect	forest	
products.	They	were	scared	of	the	Maoists	and	the	Nepal	Army	and	of	being	caught	
in	 the	 forest	 during	 a	 confrontation.	 However,	 as	 forest	 products	were	 (and	 are)	
essential	 for	 most	 users’	 livelihoods,	 negotiating	 access	 to	 their	 forests	 was	 very	
important.		
	
In	addition	to	the	strategies	already	mentioned,	groups	created	ways	of	proving	that	
they	were	CFUG	members	to	avoid	harassment	or	violence	when	entering	forested	
areas,	namely	by	 issuing	 identity	cards.	This	use	of	 identity	cards	 to	prove	people	
were	 group	 members	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 widespread.	 The	 kind	 of	 cards	 issued	
varied;	 but	most	 often,	 it	was	 a	 system	negotiated	with	 the	 local	Maoist	 or,	more	
often,	Nepal	Army	commanders.	One	of	the	user	groups	in	a	Nepal	Army	controlled	
area	 agreed	 on	 making	 a	 fixed	 number	 of	 cards	 that	 the	 army	 kept.	 Members	
requested	a	card	when	they	planned	to	go	to	the	forest,	with	one	card	per	group	of	
people.	
	
Another	strategy	used	by	a	group	in	an	area	where	the	Maoists	and	the	Nepal	Army	
often	clashed	was	to	thin	out	their	forest:	
We	carried	out	heavy	thinning	and	pruning	in	one	block	as	the	Nepal	Army	
used	to	pass	through	un‐noticed	and	we	wished	to	see	if	they	were	passing	
through.		Also,	this	made	it	difficult	for	the	Maoists	to	ambush	the	Nepal	
Army	as	they	could	not	hide	in	the	forest.	Previously…	the	Maoists	had	
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ambushed	[an	army	patrol]	and	killed	an	officer,	and	in	retaliation	the	army	
had	killed	six	villagers.	(Western	region,	disputed	area)	
By	thinning	the	forest,	this	group	regained	control	over	their	forest,	and	presumably	
their	resources,	since	they	had	stockpiled	the	trees	they	cut	down	for	 later	use.	 In	
some	respects,	this	group	sacrificed	some	of	its	long‐term	forest	management	goals	
in	 order	 to	 alleviate	 the	 short	 term	 pressures	 of	 living	 under	 conflict.	 Yet,	 by	
engaging	 in	 this	 tactic,	 the	 group	 clearly	 felt	 their	 livelihoods	 would	 be	 best	
protected	in	both	the	short	and	long	term.	
	
Use	of	funds	
One	 of	 the	 issues	 raised	most	 frequently	 by	 respondents	was	 the	 control	 of	 user	
group	 funds.	 The	 Maoists	 imposed	 forced	 donations	 on	 any	 person	 or	 group	
perceived	 to	 have	 funds	 in	 order	 to	 finance	 their	 ‘People’s	 War’.	 Nearly	 all	 the	
groups	 interviewed	 told	 how	 they	 had	 to	 compromise	 with	 the	 Maoists	 to	 resist	
handing	over	large	‘donations’	and	to	retain	some	control	over	how	their	funds	were	
spent.	For	example:		
They	initially	asked	for	NR	20,000…	We	called	together	all	of	the	ten	local	
user	groups…	and	decided	not	to	register…	Then	the	Maoists	came	back	with	
a	demand	to	register	with	a	NR	1,000	fine	plus	NR	100	per	person…	We	
called	a	general	assembly…	and	decided	not	to	pay…	In	the	end,	we	thought	
we	should	‘survive’	[protect	ourselves]	….and	so	decided	to	collect	NR	50	per	
user	group	member	(Eastern	region,	disputed	area)	
Although	 these	groups	did	 lose	some	control	over	 their	 revenue,	 they	managed	 to	
negotiate	so	that	they	ended	up	only	giving	a	token	amount.	The	group	managed	to	
retain	some	control	over	their	fund,	but	lost	more	control	over	their	forests.		
	
In	addition	to	negotiation,	another	common	strategy	was	for	user	groups	to	spend	
their	 cash	 reserves	 quickly	 on	 projects	 that	 would	 be	 deemed	 ‘pro‐poor’	 or	
appropriate	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 the	 Maoists.	 This	 finding	 is	 particularly	 important,	 as	
donors	working	with	community	 forestry	knew	that	expenditure	 increased	during	
the	conflict	but	did	not	understand	why.		
We	had	NR	90,000…	this	went	for	different	activities	including	NR	8,000	to	
the	Maoists…	and	also	for	benefiting	poor	people….	Basically,	they	controlled	
our	finances...	[Later	in	the	conflict]	we	had	NR	10,000	and	decided	to	give	it	
to	the	school	rather	than	to	the	Maoists…	We	managed	to	use	our	money	for	
local	services	like	schools	and	for	community	benefit…	We	continued	to	
work…	and	made	our	expenses	public.	(Western	region,	Maoist‐controlled	
area)		
	
Despite	many	similar	examples,	not	all	groups	successfully	protected	their	finances.	
Some	 tried	 keeping	 two	 sets	 of	 accounts	—	one	 to	 show	 the	Maoists	 (with	 lesser	
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amounts)	and	another	accurate	one.	But	most	said	that	this	was	too	risky,	and	as	the	
conflict	progressed	they	stopped	this	practice.	One	exception	was	a	group	that	found	
itself	under	potentially	high	demands	from	the	state.	
After	the	Government	made	the	policy	[in	the	year	2000]	that	each	user	
group	had	to	pay	40%	of	its	revenues	to	the	Government,	we	kept	two	sets	of	
accounts	to	hide	our	income...	We	kept	one	up‐to‐date	record	for	internal	
purposes	and	another	to	show	the	Government.	But	every	household	knew	
the	status	of	our	fund.	(Western	region,	disputed	area)	
In	 the	 Terai,	 one	 group	 ‘compromised’	 to	 retain	 control	 over	 their	 resources	 by	
allowing	the	Maoists	to	use	their	CFUG	timber	stamp	to	sell	their	timber	in	exchange	
for	being	left	to	operate.	The	Maoists	were	keen	to	sell	timber	from	CFUGs	to	raise	
revenue	but	could	not	do	so	without	an	official	stamp	so	they	had	to	obtain	one	from	
somewhere.	 Allowing	 the	Maoists	 to	 use	 their	 stamp	was	 a	 very	 risky	 strategy,	 if	
caught,	the	group	would	have	been	in	violation	of	the	law,	but	it	was	a	risk	the	group	
felt	they	had	to	take,	or	was	worth	taking.	
	
These	examples	show	the	variety	of	strategies	and	tactics	used	by	CFUGs	to	retain	
their	 ability	 to	 operate	 during	 the	 conflict.	 Through	 all	 these	 examples,	 the	
confidence	group	members	gained	through	community	forestry	in	promoting	their	
own	needs	and	agendas	even	to	actors	more	powerful	(and	violent)	than	themselves	
becomes	clear.	Such	 insights	 show	the	resilience	as	well	as	 some	of	 the	sufferings	
that	the	conflict	brought	to	people’s	everyday	lives.	
	
3.	Explaining	vulnerability	
In	addition	to	the	success	stories	recounted	above,	the	study	found	that	a	number	of	
groups	were	less	resilient	during	the	conflict.	It	was	user	groups	who	lacked	a	sound	
structure	who	were	most	vulnerable	—	in	particular	those	whose	use	of	funds	was	
not	transparent	or	was	corrupt.	These	groups	were	unable	to	claim	the	‘moral	high	
ground’	and,	according	to	the	testimonies	of	people	familiar	with	the	groups,	some	
of	 the	disadvantaged	members	worked	against	 their	own	groups	because	 they	 felt	
the	 processes	 were	 unjust.	 Groups	 were	 also	 vulnerable	 when	 the	 compromises	
they	were	forced	to	make	were	too	great.	
	
Groups	where	the	Maoists	forcibly	took	control	of	executive	committees	seemed	to	
have	 lost	more	control	of	decision	making	than	 in	places	where	 they	were	able	 to	
retain	more	control	over	the	committee.	Experience	from	a	Maoist	controlled	area	in	
Terai	 showed	 that	 although	 all	 the	 political	 parties	were	 represented	 in	 the	 user	
groups,	 the	 Maoists	 dominated	 everyone.	 They	 placed	 their	 cadres	 on	 the	
committees,	promoted	their	party’s	decisions	and	expelled	and	punished	committee	
members	who	did	not	agree	with	them.	
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Many	groups,	and	especially	those	in	disputed	areas,	had	stories	of	major	struggles,	
of	fear	and	of	being	unable	to	operate,	including	the	following	group,	which	had	to	
give	up	control	over	how	its	funds	were	spent.	
Our	budget	was	not	under	our	control…	the	Maoists	managed	it	…	And	there	
was	embezzlement…	We	had	to	do	whatever	they	said…	(Western	region,	
Maoist‐controlled	area)	
One	group	from	a	disputed	area	in	the	Mid‐West	said	that	a	lack	of	group	cohesion	
resulting	 from	 the	 politicisation	 of	 group	 activities	 caused	many	 problems	due	 to	
the	continuous	debates	between	a	 faction	opting	 for	 the	new	order	offered	by	 the	
Maoists,	and	the	other	faction	that	opted	for	the	old	order.	In	the	Terai,	one	group	
claimed	that	nearby	user	groups	had	been	unable	to	operate	‘due	to	corruption’.	The	
conflict	 seems	 to	 have	 thrown	 into	 relief	 any	 problems	 with	 corruption	 or	
domination	 of	 decision	 making	 by	 elite	 members.	 Finally,	 some	 groups	 were	 not	
able	 to	 operate	 at	 all	 during	 the	 conflict	 and	 today	 are	 still	 struggling	 to	 re‐start	
their	committees.		
	
It	seems	that	user	groups	that	lost	large	parts	of	their	funds	to	the	Maoists	lost	the	
most	 resilience.	Many	of	 the	groups	 that	 lost	 control	over	 their	 forests	during	 the	
conflict	 have	 since	 re‐established	 control	 once	 the	 fear	 of	 going	 to	 the	 forest	was	
removed.	But	groups	who	had	to	relinquish	large	amounts	of	money	or	were	unable	
to	retain	control	over	how	their	 funds	were	spent	suffered	more.	The	members	of	
such	groups	lost	a	sense	of	working	for	a	common	goal	and	stopped	following	user	
groups	 rules	 such	 as	 prohibitions	 on	 open	 grazing.	 These	 findings	 point	 to	 some	
important	areas	for	further	research.	The	funds	and	forest	resources	of	CFUGs	was	
not	only	desired	by	the	conflicting	parties,	but	was	also	an	important	focal	point	for	
the	groups.	 If	 access	 to	 the	 forest	 and	 their	 cash	 funds	was	 curtailed	 significantly,	
the	group	itself	lost	focus	and	an	identity.	As	donors	seek	to	support	development	in	
the	 face	 of	 conflict,	 attention	 to	 the	 structures	 and	 practices	 that	 will	 help	 local	
people	 to	 retain	 access	 to	 their	 financial	 as	well	 as	 physical	 resources	 is	 vital	 for	
ensuring	long‐term	livelihood	continuity.	
 
Conclusions		
This	 study	 explored	 the	 factors	 that	 contributed	 to	 CFUGs	 resilience	 during	 the	
conflict	in	Nepal.	The	reasons	were	not	the	same	for	each	group,	but	there	are	some	
common	patterns.	The	design	of	community	forestry	as	a	national	programme	and	
the	 institutional	 structure	 supported	 by	 LFP	 specifically	 were	 clearly	 central	 for	
helping	 to	 generate	 an	 image	 of	 neutrality	 as	well	 as	 pro‐poor,	 inclusive	 and	 just	
processes	 of	 forest	management.	 The	 decentralised	 nature	 of	 community	 forestry	
and	 its	 emphasis	 on	 public,	 transparent	 systems	 of	 governance,	 is	 the	 most	
important	aspect	of	structure.	This	image	was	fundamental	for	groups	to	be	able	to	
claim	 the	 right	 to	 operate	 and	 in	many	 instances,	 to	 claim	 a	 ‘moral	 high	 ground’	
when	negotiating	with	the	conflict	parties.	The	Maoists	and	the	Army	found	it	very	
difficult	 to	 contest	 a	 CFUG’s	 right	 to	 access	 and	 control	 over	 their	 resources	
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provided	the	group	could	demonstrate	they	were	operating	correctly.	Furthermore,	
good	governance	and	capacity	building	in	the	group	meant	that	individual	members	
had	well	 developed	 negotiating	 skills	 that	 they	 used	 confidently	with	 the	 conflict	
parties.		
Second,	 CFUGs	 were	 resilient	 because	 they	 had	 resources,	 both	 physical	 and	
financial.	Financial	resources	in	particular	seem	to	have	been	extremely	 important	
as	they	made	CFUGs	both	a	target	and	gave	them	bargaining	leverage.	The	Maoists	
sought	to	tax	CFUGs	to	finance	their	war,	but	it	was	also	an	asset	the	CFUGs	sought	
to	retain	control	over.	Perhaps	in	part	because	the	funds	were	collective,	rather	than	
individual,	it	was	difficult	for	the	Maoists	to	try	to	seize	all	the	funds	as	they	did	with	
many	private	individuals	and	landlords.	And	there	is	no	doubt	that	in	many	places,	
CFUG	members	were	also	Maoist	and	they	helped	to	convince	local	commanders	not	
to	take	all	the	CFUG	assets.		
The	control	over	resources	also	helped	to	give	groups	a	reason	for	sticking	together	
and	 to	 engage	 in	 dialogue	 with	 the	 conflict	 parties	 if	 their	 control	 and	 access	 to	
resources	was	threatened.	In	particular,	they	sought	to	maintain	access	to	both	their	
cash	 funds	and	 their	 forestry	 resources,	even	 if	 to	do	so	required	 them	to	give	up	
some	control	over	them.	As	the	conflict	progressed,	it	seems	that	all	parties	changed	
their	 tactics	 somewhat.	 The	 Army	 and	Maoists	 realised	 that	 they	 could	 not	 deny	
local	 people	 access	 to	 resources	 they	 required	 for	 their	 daily	 subsistence	 over	
extended	periods	of	time,	and	that	they	could	not	control	forest	spaces	without	the	
assistance	of	CFUGs.	
Third,	CFUGs	showed	tremendous	capacity	for	learning	and	adaptation	which	we	at	
least	 in	part	 attribute	 to	 the	other	 two	key	 reasons	we	have	 identified:	 the	 sound	
structure	 of	 community	 forestry	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 retain	 their	 resources.	 CFUGs	
employed	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 creative	 strategies	 to	maintain	 access	 to	 and	 control	
over	 their	resources	and	CFUG	committees,	 including:	 identity	cards,	 changing	 the	
context	 or	 the	 timing	 of	 their	meetings,	 negotiating	with	 the	 conflict	 parties,	 and	
relinquishing	some	control	over	their	processes	in	order	to	keep	the	group	and	its	
resources	intact.	This	latter	point	is	the	most	contentious	and	points	to	some	of	the	
vulnerabilities	 of	 CFUGs.	 Where	 the	 compromises	 to	 keep	 functioning	 were	 too	
great,	 groups	 lost	 resilience	and	many	of	 these	groups	 continue	 to	 struggle	 in	 the	
post‐conflict	 setting.	 Nevertheless,	 we	 believe	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	
resilience	implies	an	ability	to	respond	flexibly	to	change	and	therefore	many	of	the	
compromises	made	in	terms	of	access	and	control	do	not	mean	the	groups	were	not	
resilient.	It	is	thus	important	to	evaluate	the	consequences	of	their	strategies	to	be	
able	to	say	they	were	not	resilient	and	to	provide	some	clues	as	to	how	to	maintain	
resilience.	
CFUGs	were	most	vulnerable	when	they	did	not	have	a	sound	structure,	particularly	
when	 their	 use	 of	 funds	 was	 not	 transparent.	 In	 such	 cases,	 their	 own	members	
worked	were	complicit	 in	undermining	their	resilience	due	to	a	sense	of	exclusion	
from	both	decision	making	 and	 resources.	 Groups	were	 also	 vulnerable	when	 the	
compromises	 they	 were	 forced	 to	 make	 were	 too	 great,	 particularly	 if	 they	
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relinquished	 large	 amounts	 of	 cash.	 All	 groups	 were	 accustomed	 to	 giving	 some	
informal	taxes	to	government	officials,	so	they	did	not	object	in	principle	to	giving	a	
tax	 to	 the	 Maoists,	 rather	 they	 objected	 if	 they	 believed	 the	 amounts	 demanded	
were	 too	 high.	 Most	 of	 the	 CFUGs	 interviewed	 successfully	 negotiated	 lower	
‘donations’,	 but	 those	 groups	 who	 were	 forced	 to	 give	 large	 amounts	 found	
themselves	foundering.	
Finally,	 the	 question	 of	 justice	 returned	 again	 and	 again	 in	 our	 study	 in	 all	 the	
groups.	The	need	for	community	forestry	practices	and	decisions	to	be	just	in	order	
to	survive	during	the	conflict	was	a	theme	that	was	repeated	in	a	variety	of	different	
guises	in	the	interviews.	Importantly,	such	ideas	of	justice	are	strongly	entrenched	
in	rural	Nepal	(perhaps	in	part	because	of	the	Maoists’	teachings	which	also	focused	
on	 issues	of	distributive	 justice),	 and	CFUGs	used	 these	 ideas	 to	claim	the	right	 to	
operate.	They	even	used	ideas	of	justice	to	argue	against	Maoist	demands	on	them,	
and	it	helped	them	to	retain	an	image	of	neutrality	with	the	Army.	In	this	sense,	the	
agenda	of	community	forestry	was	not	incompatible	with	that	of	the	Maoists.	Such	
an	agenda	was	also	one	that	the	Army	could	not	easily	deny	and	required	them	to	
make	compromises	with	CFUGs	over	access	to	forests	throughout	the	conflict.	Thus,	
the	 conflicting	 parties	 and	 CFUGs	 learned	 throughout	 the	 insurgency	 period	 and	
most	CFUGs	were	able	to	negotiate	operating	space	for	themselves	on	the	basis	that	
their	activities	were	for	the	benefit	of	all,	and	necessarily	for	their	survival.	
These	 stories	 have	 helped	 to	 explain	 why	 (and	 how)	 CFUGs	 remained	 resilient	
during	 the	 conflict.	 Such	 lessons	 are	 crucial	 for	 development	 planners	 as	 they	
attempt	 to	 promote	 natural	 resource	 management	 regimes	 that	 can	 weather	 the	
challenges	 posed	 by	 climate	 change	 and	 violent	 conflict.	 The	 stories	 also	 give	 us	
another	look	into	the	everyday	experience	of	conflict	in	Nepal	and	show	how	people	
used	 institutions,	creativity	and	skills	 they	 learned	through	community	 forestry	 to	
create	 space	 for	 livelihood	 activities	 and	 maintain	 a	 commitment	 to	 long	 term	
forestry	management.	Not	 all	 groups	were	 successful,	 of	 course,	 but	 nevertheless,	
the	experience	from	Nepal	helps	to	show	the	agency	and	power	of	rural	residents	in	
the	 face	 of	 conflict	 as	 a	 counter	 weight	 to	 narratives	 that	 frame	 them	 simply	 as	
victims	or	perpetrators	of	violence.	
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